First; there is no picture to illustrate this analysis, the subject matter is too serious for a pretty picture.
Secondly; I did write a general disclaimer with respect to all my
forecasts when I started this blog and, of course, that still stands. But since
what follows relates to such a sensitive area of world politics, I want to
especially reiterate that warning here.
The forecasts that follow have been prepared based on a
specific type of analysis which , so far, has proved successful in around
70-75% of examples so far. That does, however, mean that around 25-30% of
predictions have been wrong.
Furthermore this is the first time an analysis of this
particular country has been attempted under this project and the choice of date
and time on which the analysis is based is still subject to trial. So, while
every effort has been made to approach the forecast with due care and attention
to the various elements, it is by no means guaranteed that the predictions
below will come to pass.
Another January 1 foundation chart
Many countries and institutions were legally established
on January 1st and thus share certain
characteristics. They are all, to some
extent, linked so developments in one are often reflected in the others.
characteristics. However, each such country
is unique in terms of its individual geomorphology, people and political
history . So what separates those countries is the extent to which they are
affected by international events and what elements of the nation are changed by
those events.
Syria (at least based on the foundation date I am using),
has some very powerful global themes built into its foundation. Chances are,
that if events do resonate to this particular moment, Syria will feel it more
deeply.
Normally the fundamental question I would be asking is when
will such key periods occur. But we know the answer to that now. And I don’t
generally do hindsight. Nevertheless, a brief recap is appropriate.
2009 to 2015
In fact, the conditions for it became perfect in the period
2010-2015. And furthermore there is evidence to suggest that in the case of
Syria only, that tied in with a probability of prolonged heightened violence.
It is not surprising then, that Syria got dragged into the
events of the 2011 “Arab Spring”. To what extent the challenges to the
incumbent Syrian leadership were influenced by the events in Tunisia, Egypt etc
and to what extent those events were an excuse for certain parties to implement
an entirely different plan is a moot point. Certainly there seems to be a lack
of an “unexpectedness” theme, which one would expect for a sudden uprising,
while the picture of simmering undercover threats to the nation’s status quo
coming to fruition is quite clear. This was coupled with the start of a long
period where the leadership would be seen to be pursuing a military agenda.
Tracking the period from 2011 to the end of 2015 shows that
Syria responded exactly as might be expected to signifiers
- first of conflict involving the leader, then increased resistance,
- followed by issues relating to chemical weapons
- and then to the increasing involvement of Islamic militants
- and the mass movement of the population.
2016
It would be good to say that 2016 would show some lessening
of the tragic conditions in Syria. But the odds of this are not yet good. There
are still critical points to be reached and a continued mix of forces in
opposition for some time before there is any sense of the pressure being
lifted. The good news is that it seems that, by and large, the worst is over.
There is little change in the themes in January 2016.
Airstrikes continue, as does pressure on Assad and fighting in general. There
is some pushback against the Islamic militants.
February is likely to see fiercer fighting by the militants,
but no let-up in the overall situation.
As the situation continues throughout the spring with no
noticeable change in any direction, the issue of the huge number of migrants
again comes to a head around April.
And indeed there maybe some shocks in relation to the
civilian population in May. These will
lead once more to pressure on Assad.
Matters intensify again around June and July. There is renewed
pressure on all sides and particularly in relation to IS.
There is some evidence to suggest that a way out for Assad
will be constructed by the autumn.
October sees the focus back on the core Syrian divisions but
there is also some sign of a turning point finally being reached in this.
There is a much clearer picture of a radical change in the
overall situation around November. Although the events that start now may not
be fully completed until the following summer. It is possible that this relates
to the beginnings of brokering peace within Syria ( i.e relating to the
original conflict excluding IS)
December sees things slip a little and there once again may
be some shocks – perhaps even relating to countries supporting the various
factions.
2017
2017 sadly sees no immediate end yet to the pressure of IS and related
airstrikes. But there is evidence to
suggest that the original disputes between the Syrian government and the rebel
army will dissipate or be at least partially resolved.
There is evidence of a change of environment even by January and that these
will be felt by many of the overall population. Perhaps accompanied by some
sudden changes in the structure of the country’s government.
March seems to be another critical point when radical
changes can be made. However the speed and extent of the changes may have some
temporary negative consequences for the general population.
By summer there is really is a dramatic change in the
picture. While IS remains a problem in
the background, the original confrontation between the Syrian government and
the rebels is now more or less over.
Of course there are residual issues, and a huge job to start
reconstructing the country.
However there is support across the country for achieving
common goals.
September 2017 looks to be one of the least challenging
months since early 2011.
Though there is brief opposition to the leadership in
November ( this could of course relate to the original leadership and be part
of the resolution of the war)
December sees a lighter picture, reduced airstrikes and the
beginning of a new phase, although this will be an uphill challenge.
2018
2018 is the first year since 2011 that shows none of the
challenging internal indications that characterised the last 7 years . There
may still be some confrontation between the leadership and the stronger Islamic
elements but the picture overall is much more benign.
The relationship between the people and the leadership is
finally in alignment by March. A new leader, or possibly a partnership with
another leader is indicated now.
By May there is a opening up of communications and a
lessening of restrictions.
Although the summer is more mixed, it is likely that the may
be a wave of migrants returning to rebuild their lives.
September may see some dramatic announcements.( Although the
same indicators could suggest some risks
re airplanes)-But the overall picture is still one of optimism and gradual
opening up.
The period from October to December is a bit more difficult.
The leadership has to face the real challenges that come from a country that
has been at war for so long, but nevertheless the overall picture is a dramatic
improvement from the picture at the beginning of 2016.
2019-2020
Dealing briefly with the following two years. There appears
to be no return to the difficult conditions of 2011-17.
The overall themes are ones of openness and optimism.
However there may some evidence to suggest that there may be
a creeping strength in Islamic sentiment, although not militarised. An
alternative interpretation to this might be in relation to the position of
women – perhaps a reflection of developments elsewhere.
Syria does not seem to tap in too strongly to the major
global themes of 2019-20. We should probably therefore turn back now to the
countries that will be affected in that period.
N.B. Chart used 1 Jan 1925, 00.00 Damascus. The date the Syrian Federation legally became the
State of Syria
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